We endogenize the liquidity and the quality of private assets in a tractable incomplete-market model with heterogeneous agents. The model decomposes the convenience yield of government bonds into a "liquidity premium" ( ‡ight to liquidity) and a "safety premium" ( ‡ight to quality) over the business cycle. When calibrated to match the U.S. aggregate output ‡uctuations and bond premiums, the model reveals that a sharp reduction in the quality, instead of the liquidity, of private assets was the culprit of the recent …nancial crisis, consistent with the perception that it was the subprime-mortgage problem that triggered the Great Recession. Since the provision of public liquidity endogenously a¤ects the provision of private liquidity, our model indicates that excessive injection of public liquidity during a …nancial crisis can be welfare reducing under either conventional or unconventional policies. In particular, too much intervention for too long can depress capital investment.
Introduction
An emerging consensus in the macro-…nance literature is that a shortage of private liquidity is the culprit of …nancial crises and business cycles because it hinders …rms' ability to borrow and …nance …xed investment, thus depressing aggregate employment and output. Classic works in this area include Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Holmström and Tirole (1998) .
In particular, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) show that a decrease in …rms' borrowing limit can hinder …rms' borrowing capacity, consequently triggering boom-bust cycles in aggregate output. On the other hand, Holmström and Tirole (1998) show that a sudden shortage in private liquidity can interrupt …rm investment and generate an economy-wide recession because such shocks cannot be insured or diversi…ed by …rms through the private asset market or …nancial intermediaries. Their model thus provides a rationale for government intervention through the provision of public liquidity during …nancial crises.
Following these seminal works, a growing literature has emerged to address the issue of private liquidity shortages during …nancial crises by explicitly embedding …nancial-market frictions into otherwise standard DSGE models. For example, Kiyotaki and Moore (2012) and Del Negro, Eggertsson, Ferrero, and Kiyotaki (2016) (Del Negro et al. hereafter) model …nancial crises as the consequence of a sudden decline in the resaleability of private assets, which hinders …rms' ability to …nance …xed investment, causing an economy-wide meltdown through general equilibrium e¤ects. Such shocks to …rms' ability to resell (or liquidate) private assets also trigger ‡ight to public liquidity, as in the model of Holmström and Tirole (1998) , leading to sharp rises in the liquidity premium of government bonds.
Due to the zero lower bound constraint on the nominal interest rate, these authors argue that unconventional policies that allow the government to directly purchase private assets can signi…cantly mitigate the …nancial crisis by boosting …rm investment. Kurlat (2013) and Bigio (2015) , on the other hand, argue that …nancial crises can also be triggered by other types of …nancial shocks, such as intensi…ed asymmetric information problems in the private asset market. 1 For example, a sudden increase of low-quality assets in the private asset market can also hinder …rms' ability to …nance investment projects, and trigger economy-wide recession or even the collapse of the private asset market. In fact, the recent global …nancial crisis started in the U.S.
subprime-mortgage market in 2006. It was this crisis that led to the global …nancial crisis in 2008 and the subsequent worldwide Great Recession. 2 However, di¤erent types of …nancial shocks may have dramatically di¤erent implications for asset price movements and bond yields as well as government policies. For example, Figure 1 shows that the "liquidity premium" and the "safety (quality) premium" across …nancial assets can behave very 1 Kurlat (2013) and Bigio (2015) build their models on Eisfeldt (2004) , an early work on the aggregate implications of adverse selection. Also see Malherbe (2014) for a three-period model on self-ful…lling liquidity dry-ups due to adverse selection in …nancial markets. 2 See more details in Section 4 about the subprime-mortgage crisis. See Section 5 for a more detailed literature review.
2 di¤erently over the business cycle: They comove strongly in some periods, especially the 2008 …nancial crisis, but they move against each other in some other episodes, such as the mid-1970s, the mid-1980s
and early 2000s. 3 Such imperfect correlations suggest that the " ‡ight to liquidity" and the " ‡ight to quality" are distinct (albeit related) animals, so their cyclical movements may reveal important information about the types of underlying …nancial shocks and the associated business-cycle propagation mechanisms. 4 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 Hence, several important questions arise naturally based on the existing macro-…nance literature:
(i) What …nancial shocks are quantitatively more important as a cause of the …nancial crisis and business cycle: the shortage of liquidity or the shortage of quality (safety) or both? 5 (ii) Can we distinguish ‡ight to liquidity and ‡ight to safety during the business cycle, or is it possible and sensible to decompose, theoretically and empirically, government bond yields into a liquidity premium 3 See Appendix A for detailed data description. 4 There is a large …nance literature dealing with the importance of di¤erentiating ‡ight to quality and ‡ight to liquidity, although they are highly correlated with each other. In ‡uential empirical works in this regard include the work of Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) , who decompose the convenience yield of government bonds into liquidity and quality (also called safety) premiums. Also see Beber, Brandt and Kavajecz (2009) , who empirically address the subtle di¤erence between ‡ight to quality and ‡ight to liquidity. Also see He, Krishnamurthy and Milbradt (2016) and Gorton (2016) for theoretical and historical analysis of safe assets (also called reserve assets) and the shortage of safe assets. In particular, as Gorton (2016) emphasizes, a "safe asset" is an asset that can be used to transact without fear of adverse selection. 5 In this paper we use quality and safety interchangeably.
and a quality premium? (iii) Should government respond di¤erently to the di¤erent types of premium changes caused by di¤erent …nancial shocks? (iv) How does the supply of public liquidity through either conventional or unconventional policies a¤ect the market resaleability (liquidity) and quality (safety) of private assets? (v) Do there exist limits of government intervention during …nancial crises?
These questions are intriguing because, as we will show shortly, when both the liquidity and the quality of private assets are endogenized and thus mutually a¤ecting each other, the liquidityshortage shock considered by Del Negro et al. (2016) implies not only that prices of private assets are countercyclical, but also that the liquidity premium and the safety premium of government bond yields move against each other. Namely, the liquidity premium is countercyclical while the quality premium is procyclical. In contrast, the …nancial shock considered by Kurlat (2013) and Bigio (2015) implies that the quality premium and the liquidity premium comove strongly with each other; namely, they are both countercyclical while asset prices are procyclical over the business cycle.
This paper provides a uni…ed framework to address these intriguing questions. In particular, we build a tractable heterogeneous-agent model with multiple …nancial frictions to facilitate the decomposition of government bond premium into a liquidity component and a quality component, both of which are endogenously determined in the model and are time-varying over the business cycle. We show how the liquidity premium and the quality premium respond di¤erently to di¤erent types of …nancial shocks. We use this knowledge to study the relative importance of di¤erent liquidity shocks in explaining the business cycle and especially the recent …nancial crisis. We also investigate how the provision of public liquidity (either through an injection of government bonds or direct purchase of troubled assets) during recessions a¤ects the incentive structure of the private asset market under di¤erent aggregate shocks.
Our main …ndings are summarized as follows: By decomposing the bond premium into a "liquidity premium" and a "safety premium" over the business cycle, our calibrated model suggests that a sharp reduction in the quality, instead of liquidity, of private assets was the culprit of the recent …nancial crisis, which is consistent with the perception that subprime-mortgage problems triggered the Great Recession. In other words, our analysis shows that the ‡ight to safety dominates the ‡ight to liquidity during the recent …nancial crisis but not necessarily in other episodes of the business cycle. We also show that since provision of public liquidity endogenously a¤ects (crowds out) the provision of private liquidity, proper policy intervention is desirable but excessive injection of public liquidity can be welfare reducing under either conventional or unconventional policies. In particular, too much government intervention can paralyze or even collapse the private asset market, exacerbating the …nancial crisis. 6
In the remainder of the paper, Section 2 sets up the core part of the model -heterogeneous …rms with multiple …nancial frictions -and shows the main theoretical properties of the model in this partial-equilibrium setting, especially the market endogeneity of the liquidity and quality of private assets. Toward the end of that section, we introduce government bonds and show how to decompose the convenience yield into a liquidity premium and a quality premium in our model. Section 3 closes the model by introducing a representative household and studies the general-equilibrium properties of the model. Section 4 calibrates the model and examines its quantitative predictions under di¤erent aggregate shocks. That section also quantitatively investigates the di¤erent contributions to the business cycle from di¤erent types of …nancial shocks. Section 5 studies the endogenous responses of the liquidity and quality of private assets as well as social welfare from the provision of public liquidity (from both conventional and unconventional policies) under di¤erent shocks, and reveals the trade-o¤ between public liquidity and private liquidity. At the end of that section we provide a more detailed literature review. Section 6 concludes the paper with remarks for future research. Appendices A-C contain data descriptions, proofs of propositions, and the model's dynamic system and its log linearization.
The Model
Our model is built on Kiyotaki and Moore (2012) , Del Negro et al. (2016) , and Kurlat (2013) and Bigio (2015) , among others. 7
Production and Cash Flows
There is a unit measure of heterogeneous …rms. In each period t 0, …rms use capital k t and labor n t to produce output y t through a constant-returns-to-scale production technology:
where A denotes aggregate total factor productivity (TFP) shocks. To simplify analysis, de…ne W t as the market wage and
as …rms' internal cash ‡ow (capital's value added). Choosing labor input optimally and then substituting out optimal labor demand in the cash ‡ow gives the marginal product of capital:
7 Also see Wang and Wen (2012) .
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Adverse Selection and Private Liquidity
The only private asset in this economy is capital. Capital can be used both as a production factor and as a …nancial asset (or liquidity). Namely, …rms can purchase or sell used capital in the …nancial market.
Analogous to Kiyotaki and Moore (2012) and Wang and Wen (2012) , there are idiosyncratic shocks to …rms' investment returns (or investment e¢ciency). That is, 1 unit of investment can be transformed into " t units of new capital, where " t is an iid shock and has the cumulative distribution F (") with support E = [" min ; " max ] and mean E (") = 1. Firms are borrowing constrained and cannot issue debt, so they can …nance investment projects through internal cash ‡ows (R K t k t ) and funds raised in the …nancial market by liquidating (selling) used capital. The e¢ciency shock " t implies that newly installed capital may be more valuable than vintage (used) capital. Hence, …rms may opt either to sell old capital to raise funds for new investment if Tobin's q is su¢ciently high, or to purchase used capital in the anticipation that future demand for liquidity (cash funds) may be high if a better investment opportunity arrives.
As in Kurlat (2013) and Bigio (2015) , there are two types of used capital in the economy: "good" and "bad." The fraction of bad capital in the economy is t 2 [0; 1], which is public knowledge but stochastic. Speci…cally, in each period t after production, t fraction of the used capital held by all …rms becomes lemons (bad capital) that will evaporate completely at the end of the period. Only the remaining 1 t fraction of capital (high-quality assets) can be carried over to the next period, subject to a normal depreciation rate 1 2 [0; 1]. This means capital's marginal product is the same regardless of its quality during the production process, as capital turns into lemons only after use. Then the average survival rate of capital is (1 t ) 1 t . Of course, when t = 0, then 1 t = , so we are back to the standard neoclassical model. Also, if = 1, then t = t . For now we assume = 1 in the theoretical analysis and will calibrate it to the data in the quantitative analysis.
Although …rms are subject to the same aggregate shock t to the quality of used capital stock after production, the true quality of each speci…c unit of capital is a …rm's private information. Namely, a …rm can tell the quality of its own capital in hand but knows nothing about other …rms' capital quality until after capital is purchased, except that on average t fraction of other …rms' capital is of low quality. The asset market for used capital opens after production and closes after investment decisions are made. For simplicity, …rms are allowed to trade only once in the asset market in each period.
Firms opt to trade (purchase and sell) used capital for several reasons: (1) to raise additional funds to …nance new investment, (2) to get rid of lemon assets before they evaporate, or (3) to accumulate liquidity (used capital) as a store of value to bu¤er future investment shocks. Hence, the resaleability of used capital means that capital can serve not only as a factor of production but also as a store of value (liquidity) to insure against idiosyncratic investment risks under borrowing constraints.
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The timeline of events within a period is graphed in Figure 2 . Speci…cally, production takes place in the beginning of each period (after all aggregate shocks are realized). After production, the asset market for used capital opens for trade, the quality of each speci…c unit of capital (asset) is revealed to capital owners, and the investment-e¢ciency shock is realized. Depending on the realization of the idiosyncratic shock " t , …rms may opt to trade used capital to enhance their investment positions before making investment decisions. At this point, since each …rm already knows the quality of its own capital, they opt to sell (…re-sell) all lemon assets (bad capital) but may or may not want to sell their high-quality assets (good capital) because of adverse selection. In particular, since the market price of good capital is the same as that of bad capital, only those …rms receiving a su¢ciently favorable shock to investment e¢ciency may opt to liquidate their good assets, so as to raise additional funds to …nance new investment projects. Firms receiving less-favorable shocks either undertake investment without liquidating good capital in hand or opt to purchase used capital from the asset market (despite the lemon problem under asymmetry information) without undertaking any investment (by waiting for better future investment opportunities). After the asset market closes and all investment decisions are made, all lemon assets in the economy evaporate and …rms pay wages and dividends to the household (owners of the …rms) by the end of the period. 
Asset Trading Strategy and Investment Decisions
For each …rm in the beginning of period t, its initial stock of capital carried over from last period is k t , which does not depreciate before the asset market opens if = 1. Denote k a t as used capital purchased or acquired (a) from the asset market after production and k s t as used capital sold (s) to the asset market after production. Of course, …rms cannot distinguish the quality of other …rms' used capital when acquiring used capital in the asset market, so the e¤ective amount of used capital a …rm acquires 
where i t denotes new investment and " t the shock to investment e¢ciency. This equation says that by the end of the day only high-quality capital is carried over to the next period.
Denoting P K t as the market price of used capital (asset price in the model), the …rm's dividend d t is given by
where low-quality capital sold to the market (k s;b t ) has the same market price as high-quality capital (k s;g t ). Due to adverse selection, the market price of used capital will be lower than the shadow value of capital (to be shown below).
Denote V t (k t ; " t ) as the value of a …rm in period t and t+1 t as the stochastic discounting factor.
Then the problem of the …rm is to maximize the present value of dividends by solving
subject to (2), (3), and the following resaleability constraints and non-negativity constraints: of good capital (for the capital owner) and the market value (price) P K t of used capital. Due to adverse selection, the market price of used capital is lower than the shadow value of capital, P K t < Q t . Thus, liquidating good capital leads to capital losses. This wedge reduces a …rm's incentive to liquidate its high-quality capital unless its investment-e¢ciency shock is su¢ciently high or above " t . So for …rms willing to sell their good capital, we have k
Proposition 1 The two cuto¤ values f" t ; " t g depend only on aggregate states and not on the history of individual …rms, and they fully characterize the distribution of …rms. Furthermore, they are related to each other by
where t 2 [0; 1] is the equilibrium fraction of high-quality assets in the asset market.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Intuitively, we would have " t = " t either in the case without private information or in the case with t = 0. Namely, the higher cuto¤ converges to the lower cuto¤ either in the case of symmetric information (for any given value of t > 0) or in the case of nonexistent lemons ( t = 0).
Proposition 2
The liquidity (resaleability) and the quality of private assets are endogenously determined in general equilibrium. In particular, given the aggregate (average) fraction of high-quality capital (1 t ) in the economy, the true asset quality t (i.e., the fraction of high-quality assets in the asset market) is given by
and the endogenously determined resaleability ! t of private assets is given by
Comment 1. Endogenous Quality t . Note that the average asset quality in the asset market is less than the average fraction of good assets in the economy, t < 1 t , due to adverse selection. In other words, the e¤ective portion of lemon assets in the market is larger than that in the overall economy, 1 t > t . This is the case because only a [1 F (" )] fraction of …rms opt to sell good capital in the asset market, while all …rms opt to …re-sell bad capital. Hence, the fraction of high-quality capital in the asset market is
selection under asymmetric information intensi…es the lemon problem. Clearly, t = 1 either in the absence of asymmetric information (i.e., asset quality is public information) or the absence of lemons (i.e., t = 0). In the former case, lemon assets have no value in the market, so the denominator becomes identical to the numerator in t . In these two cases we have " t = " t .
Namely, in the absence of adverse selection, …rms always opt to sell high-quality capital to …nance new investment whenever " t " t .
Comment 2. Endogenous Liquidity (Resaleability) ! t . Since …rms can resell a maximum ! t portion of their used capital (either good or bad) when so desired, and since …rms do not always resell good capital due to asset-price distortions under adverse selection, the marginal propensity to resell used capital (an endogenous measure of resaleability in our model) is given by ! t in equation (9), where the …rst term t and the second term (1 t )
1 F (" t ) in the brackets denote, respectively, the fraction of lemon assets and the fraction of high-quality assets in the market. So ! t k t is the actual portion of total assets a …rm is willing to sell to the market. This endogenous measure of resaleability is lower than the exogenously speci…ed resaleability ! t because adverse selection reduces …rms' propensity to resale their good capital even when liquidity is needed. In other words, …rms want to dump all lemons into the market with the upper limit t ! t . On the other hand, since
is less than 1 and it measures the conditional probability of reselling high-quality assets given that the …rm is
1 F (" t ) ! t is the actual fraction of high-quality assets supplied to the market. Clearly,
1 F (" t ) = 1 when " t = " t (or when t = 1); in this case, we have ! t = ! t . Therefore, the marginal propensity (ability) to resell used capital is the true measure of resaleability in the model, which is lower than and bounded above by ! t -the fundamental resaleability constraint. Most importantly, the endogenous resaleability ! t is state dependent and thus responsive to aggregate shocks. In particular, ! t is a monotonically decreasing function of t 2 [0; max ], where max < 1 is the critical value of t such that the asset market collapses for t max , because too many lemons can crash the market by driving out all good assets.
This implication is in sharp contrast to the model of Kiyotaki and Moore (2012) and will be discussed in detail in a later section.
Proposition 3 The shadow value of capital Q t is related to the lower cuto¤ " t by
and the market price of used capital is related to the higher cuto¤ by
Intuitively, the marginal cost of investment is 1 (in terms of output or consumption goods) and the shadow value of 1 unit of new capital is Q (units of output). Since 1 unit of investment can yield " units of new capital (under the e¢ciency shock), which are worth "Q units of output, then a …rm will undertake investment if and only if "Q 1, or "
. This is Tobin's q theory -individual …rm's q is simply "Q, where
Since 1 unit of used (high-quality) capital is as good as 1 unit of new capital if kept in hand, its shadow value is Q. On the other hand, 1 unit of used capital is worth only P K real dollars (units of output) in the asset market; so if a …rm opts to resell used (high-quality) capital in the asset market to …nance new investment, then it must be the case that "QP K Q, or "
we have P K = Q < Q; namely, the market price of used capital is lower than the shadow value of good capital under adverse selection.
Clearly, in the absence of adverse selection, either because of the lack of asymmetric information (i.e., asset quality is public information) or because there are no lemons in the economy (i.e., = 0),
we have P K = Q and " = " .
Bond Premium and Its Decomposition
This subsection introduces government bonds as an alternative store of value for …rms. We assume (consistent with the empirical work of Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2012 ) that government bonds are perfectly safe and liquid (i.e., without any information frictions and resaleability constraints), so that they command a premium over capital (equity) returns. 8 Since private asset (capital) returns are a¤ected by both resaleability constraints and information risk, our model provides a natural framework to decompose the bond premium into a liquidity component and a safety (quality) component, for which we can analyze their business-cycle properties.
Given the productivity of capital, …rms will hold both public liquidity and private liquidity under the no-arbitrage condition. Obviously, …rms will demand more public liquidity in the case of a negative shock to ! t simply because private assets become harder to sell (less liquid), so bond premium rises as a result of " ‡ight to liquidity", leading to a higher "liquidity premium."
Firms also demand more government bonds in the case of a positive shock to t when private assets become riskier, so the bond premium rises as a consequence of the ‡ight to quality, leading to a higher quality premium.
However, because in general equilibrium the resaleability (! t ) and quality ( t ) of private assets are both endogenous, the liquidity premium and the quality premium behave di¤erently and contribute di¤erently to ‡uctuations in the bond premium under di¤erent aggregate shocks.
Denoting P B t as the market price of government bonds and b t as a …rm's end-of-period holding of government bonds, the problem of the …rm is modi…ed slightly to
subject to
and the same constraints in equations (2)-(6).
Proposition 4 (Decomposition of Yields) The convenience yield (CY) (spread between the rate of return to private assets and the rate of return to government bonds) can be decomposed into a liquidity premium (r ! t ) and a safety premium (r t ):
where lim !!1 r ! t = 0 and lim !0 r t = 0. That is, the liquidity premium vanishes when ! = 1 and the quality premium vanishes when = 0.
General Equilibrium Analysis
We show how to exploit the di¤erences in the liquidity premium and quality premium to shed light on the recent …nancial crisis in the U.S. To facilitate the analysis, we close the model by adding a household sector below.
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Household
The problem of a representative household is given by max fCt;Nt;s
where is the time discount factor, C t is consumption, N t is the labor supply, and V i t and s i t are, respectively, the equity price of …rm i 2 [0; 1] and the associated share holdings. The household receives labor income W t N t and pays lump-sum tax T t to the government.
Denoting t as the Lagrangian multiplier of the household budget constraint, the …rst-order conditions (FOCs) with respect to consumption (C t ), the labor supply (N t ), and the holdings of …rm shares
are given, respectively, by
where the last equation pertains to the …rm's objective function studied earlier.
Steady-State Properties
The system of dynamic equations in general equilibrium is provided in Appendix C. Here we show that there exist two steady states in the model (for certain parameter values): (i) a high steady state with a positive rate of return to bonds, R B H 1=P B > 1 and (ii) a low steady state with a negative return to government bonds, R B L < 1. The dashed blue lines in the left panel in Figure 3 shows a backward-bending curve of bond yields, which intersects with the vertical bar (bond supply) at two di¤erent values of bond yields R B . 9
Multiple steady states arise in this model because of a participation externality in the asset market:
The equilibrium asset price is higher when more high-quality assets are traded and lower when fewer 9 The panels in Figure 3 show the yield curve of government bonds, a relationship between bond returns and aggregate bond supply. The horizontal axes denote the level of total bond supply B and the vertical axes denote the equilibrium yield (rate of return) to bonds. The vertical bars indicate a particular level of the bond supply. The solid red lines represent bond yields in the case of perfect information ( e R B ) and are upward sloping. The dashed blue lines represent bond yields under imperfect information.
high-quality assets are traded. Which equilibrium prevails depends on …rms' beliefs about other …rms' actions. Intuitively, the second (low) steady state arises if …rms believe that the lemon problem is so severe such that they are willing to hold bonds even if they yield a negative rate of return, as in the case of inventories (Wen, 2011) , because in this case the safety and liquidity of bonds make them such a desirable store of value when used capital is too illiquid due to severe adverse selection. This case is close but not identical to the case where the private asset market is shut down completely.
Proposition 5 The steady state of the model can be solved recursively in a loop. In particular, given the private-asset price P K , we can solve all aggregate variables in the following list sequentially (one by one): f" ; ; Q; " ; P B ; R B ; R K ; Proof. See Appendix B.
The bond-market clearing condition solves for private asset price P K t in the model, suggesting that the provision of public liquidity interacts with the incentive structure of the provision of private assets.
This important property is missing in the aforementioned existing literature.
The reason is that bond yields a¤ects the demand and supply of private assets, hence the liquidity and quality of assets traded in the market. This endogenous relationship between bond yields and private asset returns holds until the limit when total bond supply becomes zero, B = 0; but the relationship breaks down if the total supply of bonds is too large, which will collapse the private asset market.
In particular, a higher bond supply raises bond yield R B , inducing …rms to hold more public liquidity and less private liquidity in their portfolio. When the supply of government bonds is high enough, say B B max , the asset market with lemons collapses because demand for used capital as a store of value vanishes. In this case, …rms hold capital only as a factor of production and hold bonds only as a store of value, which causes a discontinuous jump in the rate of return to bonds from R B to R B > R B , where R B denotes the rate of return to bonds without information frictions (see the red line in the top of the left panel in Figure 3) , as in the model of Del Negro et al. (2016) .
This discontinuity happens because the rate of return to bonds without information frictions ( R B ) lies strictly above the rate of return to bonds with private information for any given level of bond supply B. Hence, when the private asset market for used capital collapses, it is as if the information problem disappears because public liquidity is now the only store of value and does not su¤er from the information problem nor the resaleability problem. In this case, our model is reduced to that of Del Negro et al. (2016) . indicates a lower fraction of high-quality capital in the asset market. These equilibrium bond returns lie strictly below the rate of return to bonds under perfect information ( R B ).
At the lower equilibrium (R B L ), trading volume, aggregate investment, consumption and output are extremely low; the marginal product of capital is extremely high; and the rate of return to bonds is negative (or P B > 1). When the lemon problem is so severe, …rms are willing to hold government bonds even if they pay a negative rate of return, exactly like the case of inventories in Wen's (2011) model, which has a negative rate of return because of the high liquidation value o¤ered by inventories (or government bonds) when alternative assets are so illiquid in meeting …rms' liquidity demand.
The middle panel in Figure 3 shows the e¤ect of the ‡ight to quality after an increase in the parameter value of . The backward-bending curve shifts down and inward, so the original high-yield equilibrium R B H drops vertically from the dashed blue line to the dashed red line. This drop in bond yields is due primarily to the ‡ight to quality. However, if this shock is big enough, the backwardbending curve may shift down too much to the origin and consequently no longer intersect with the vertical bar, suggesting a collapse of the asset market when the problem of adverse selection intensi…es beyond a critical level.
In contrast, the right panel in Figure 3 shows the e¤ect of the ‡ight to liquidity after a decrease in the resaleability parameter value !, which makes private assets less liquid and resalable. The backward-bending curve shifts down and outward (instead of inward), and the high-yield equilibrium R B H drops only slightly. The e¤ect becomes ambiguous if the vertical bar is su¢ciently far away from the origin. Most importantly, the asset market appears more robust (in terms of the likelihood of collapse) to the shock that reduces the liquidity (resaleability) of private assets (!) than to the shock that reduces the quality of private assets ( ). 16 ‡ight to safety, or both? We believe that our theoretical model can help answer such a question and shed light on the mechanisms behind the recent …nancial crisis.
The rest of this paper considers business-cycle dynamics only around the high steady state with positive bond returns, which is saddle stable and subject to only fundamental shocks. We leave the business-cycle analysis around the second steady state and the associated sunspot-driven ‡uctuations to a separate project.
4 Business-Cycle Analysis
Calibration
The time period is one quarter. We set = 0:36 to match the labor share of 64%, = 0:5 to yield a Frisch elasticity of 2, and = 0:025 to match the 10% annual depreciation rate of capital. In addition, assume that the investment e¢ciency " follows the Pareto distribution, F (") = 1 ("=" min ) with
" " min and > 1. = 0:978, which is close to the value of 0:96 proposed by Kurlat (2013) . In addition, as speci…ed in Section 2, we normalize the investment e¢ciency shock at E (") = 1. Since E (") = 1 " min , we then have " min = 1 1 = 0:86. Moreover, as calculated by Del Negro et al. (2016) , the annualized real return of government bonds is around 2:2%. Thus we set R B = 1:0055 for one quarter, which implies the time discount factor = 1= h R B 1 + 1 i = 0:985. Finally, we set = 6:42 so that the fraction of hours worked N = 0:25, as is standard in the literature. Table 1 summarizes the calibrations.
The aggregate amount of used capital traded in the asset market is
and the aggregate new investment is
Therefore, the ratio of investment in used capital to total investment is S S+I : The market for used capital in the U.S. is non-trivial. Using Compustat dataset, Eisfeldt and Rampini (2005) show that the ratio 
Impulse Responses
We assume three aggregate shocks in the model: (i) a TFP shock (A t ), which follows the law of motion in log-linear form:Â t = AÂt 1 + " A t ; (ii) an information shock ( t ), which follows^ t = ^ t 1 + " t ; (iii) and a resaleability shock (! t ), which follows! t = !!t 1 + " ! t . Figure 5 shows the impulse responses of output (Y t ), asset prices (P K t ), the bond yield (R B t ) and bond premiums (r ! t and r t ) in the model to a negative TFP shock in the top-row panel, a negative information shock to 1 t (a rise in the fraction of lemon assets in the economy) in the middle-row panel, and a negative liquidity shock to ! t (a reduction in the resaleability of private assets) in the bottom-row panel. So from the left to right in each row panel, the 1st window is output, the 2nd window is asset prices, the 3rd window is bond yields, and the 4th window plots the liquidity premium r t (solid line) and the safety premium r ! t (dashed line). Clearly, all three shocks are able to generate a deep recession in output (1st window in each row panel) and a sharp decline in bond yields (3rd window in each row panel). However, the price of private asset declines under TFP shock and information shock (2nd window in the top and bottom panels), but rises under resaleability shock (2nd window in the middle panel), making the resaleability shock inconsistent with the U.S. data along this dimension. The liquidity premium remains nearly constant under a TFP shock, and rises under both an information shock and a resaleability shock (solid lines in the 4th column). The quality premium rises under a TFP shock and an information shock, but declines under a resaleability shock (dashed lines in the 4th column). In particular, the liquidity premium and the safety premium move against each other under a resaleability shock.
Putting it together, in the bottom-row panel, the rising equity (private asset) prices and falling bond yields suggest that the resaleability shock causes a shortage in the supply of private liquidity, not in its demand. A supply-side shortage in private liquidity also causes ‡ight to liquidity under the assets-substitution e¤ect, hence we see a sharp rise in the liquidity premium (solid line). However, there is also a sharp decrease in the quality premium. The procyclical movement in the quality premium is interesting -it can happen only if there is an increase in the average quality of private assets in the asset market so that …rms are willing to hold more private assets than government bonds. The reason is that when a tightened supply-side constraint on the resaleability of private assets causes a rise (instead of a fall) in asset prices, the high cuto¤ " t = 1=P K t is lowered so that selling o¤ high-quality assets is encouraged. That is, when the intensive margin of resaleability is tightened, the economy adjusts through the extensive margin by encouraging more …rms with relatively low investment e¢ciency to liquidate high-quality assets to …nance investment, which in turn raises the average quality of private assets in the market, making equity a safer asset to hold than without the shock, despite the fact that capital is now less liquid. Hence, the quality premium drops sharply while the liquidity premium rises sharply.
On the other hand, under the information shock t ", there are more lemon assets in the economy, causing a ‡ight to quality and a rise in the safety premium. In the meantime, since the demand for private assets is reduced, the endogenously determined resaleability ! t declines, causing the liquidity premium also to rise as if there is an exogenous shock to the resaleability of private assets.
Hence, once the resaleability (! t ) and the quality ( t ) of private assets are endogenized in our model, these critical di¤erences in the responses of the quality premium and the liquidity premium under the resaleability shock ! t and the information shock t as well as the TFP shock can provide a litmus test for macro-…nance theories. In what follows, we will utilize the recent …nancial crisis as a natural experiment, during which both the quality premium and the liquidity premium increased sharply (see Figure 1) , to quantify the contributions of di¤erent …nancial shocks.
Contributions of Di¤erent Shocks
Following Azariadis, Kaas and Wen (2015), we conduct the following exercise. As shown in Appendix C, the log-linearized dynamic system for aggregate variables in our model implies the following relationship between endogenous variables and the exogenous shocks (the state space):
where the aggregate capital stock is also in the state space. We can invert this equation to obtain
which suggests that given time-series information about the aggregate variables on the right-hand side of the equation, we can back-solve the three unobservable shocks fA t ; t ; ! t g based on the calibrated model. Then we can examine each shock's business-cycle properties and their respective contributions to the recent …nancial crisis.
The back-solved three shocks, TFP (Â t ), information (^ t ), and resaleability (! t ), are graphed in Figure 6 . In general,Â t and! t are strongly procyclical, while^ t is countercyclical, which are intuitive and in line with the literature. Note that comparing the 1973 oil crisis and the 2008 …nancial crisis, the middle panel and the bottom panel suggest that resaleability (! t ) was a serious issue during the oil crisis, while adverse selection (^ t ) was much worse in the recent …nancial crisis. decline of the quality of private assets (the middle panel). Since we did not include bond yields in our VARs (equation 19) to back-solve the three shocks, the sum of the three shocks together do not necessarily explain 100% of the bond yields. Thus, Figure 8 provides an independent test to our story -that asset safety (adverse selection) instead of liquidity (resaleability) per se was the culprit of the recent …nancial crisis. 12
This result is consistent with the history and a large literature's claim that the subprime-mortgage crisis started in 2007 triggered the global …nancial crisis and the Great Recession. Prior to the crisis, home loans in the subprime-mortgage market were often packaged together, and converted into 1 1 Figure C .1 in the Appendix C shows that back-solved resaleability shocks can explain most of the business-cycle movements in the measured liquidity premium in the U.S. data (r ! t ) shown in Figure 1 , but such shocks cannot generate enough ‡uctuations in output and bond yields in the model. 1 2 The over-shooting of the model-implied bond yields during the 2008 …nancial crisis under information shocks could be due to the zero lower bound constraint on bond yields in the U.S. data, which is not imposed in our model. Empirical support of the signi…cant relevance of adverse selection in …nancial markets, especially for the recent …nancial crisis, includes the work of Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig (2010) , who show that the quality of loans with a lower probability of being securitized is higher than for those with a higher probability. Besides, Metrick (2010, 2012) demonstrate the haircut rate of repos rose signi…cantly following the start of the crisis, which also re ‡ected a negative shock to adverse selection in the …nancial markets. Literature on information asymmetry in …nancial markets prior to the recent …nancial crisis includes Downing, Ja¤ee and Wallace (2009), Demiroglu and James (2012), Krainer and Laderman (2014), and Piskorski, Seru and Witkin (2015) .
Optimal Provision of Public Liquidity
The impulse-response analysis in the previous section shows that economic recessions can be caused by a shortage of private liquidity such that the demand for public liquidity (e.g., government bonds) increases during recessions, where the shortage can come either from the supply side (such as lower asset resaleability) or from the demand side (such as lower asset quality). Hence, a countercyclical provision of public liquidity by the government may be productive, as suggested by the seminal work of Holmström and Tirole (1998) , among many others.
However, our analysis in this section shows that this is not necessarily the case -namely, provision of public liquidity can be welfare reducing, depending on the parameter values and the extent of the government intervention.
We consider two types of government provision of public liquidity during an economic crisis: (i) the issuing of more government bonds and (ii) the direct purchase of private assets. We call the …rst policy conventional and the second policy unconventional and consider them in turn. We will show that under reasonable parameter values, countercyclical provision of public liquidity through the conventional policy can be welfare reducing unless private assets are extremely illiquid and risky, in contrast to the …ndings and arguments of Holmström and Tirole (1998) . We also show that countercyclical provision of public liquidity through the unconventional policy is unambiguously welfare improving, but only up to a limit -beyond which the purchase of private assets by the government is also welfare reducing, in contrast to the results of Del Negro et al. (2016) .
Conventional Policy
We assume that the government bond supply follows a state-contingent policy in the following simple form:
where B t+1 denotes bond supply in period t as a reaction function of the level of private liquidity in the economy (relative to its steady state value) and L t P K t S t denotes the total market value of private liquidity, where S t is the aggregate volume of trade of private assets in the market, as de…ned in equation (17). The log-linearized form of the conventional policy around the steady state isB t+1 =B t L t , where measures the responsiveness (elasticity) of the bond supply to changes in private liquidity. The government budget constraint is given by
We compute the welfare gains of such a state-contingent policy as a function of . Let U
denote the expected lifetime household utility when the policy is inactive ( = 0), and U = E P 1
the expected lifetime household utility when the policy is active ( 6 = 0). Then the welfare gains of the countercyclical policy under a particular 24 aggregate shock process (as speci…ed in the previous impulse response section) is given by Figure 9 plots the welfare gains, where the top-row panel pertains to parameter calibrations in Table 1 and the bottom-row panel to alternative parameter calibrations (to be speci…ed below). In each row panel, the left window shows welfare gains under a 1% negative TFP shock (A t #), the middle window under a 1% information shock ( t "), and the right window under a 1% resaleability shock ( ! t #). Notice that the welfare gain ( ) is estimated over the entire impulse response period and the steady state after an aggregate shock.
Interestingly, regardless of the shocks (top-row panel), the conventional policy is counter-productive.
In particular, welfare is a decreasing function of for 0. This is the case because public liquidity crowds out private liquidity by reducing …rms' incentives for …xed investment. This crowding-out e¤ect reduces welfare because capital is also a production factor. Table 1 and footnote 13).
However, if we recalibrate the steady-state values of f !; g such that both the resaleability limit and the information quality of assets are extremely low, 13 then the provision of public liquidity through the conventional policy can be welfare improving up to a limit, as suggested in the lower panel of Figure 9 . In particular, regardless of the shocks, the welfare-gain function is strictly positive for 2 [0; max ], where max is around 0:28 for TFP shocks and around 0:2 for the other two shocks.
But the welfare-gain function starts to decline monotonically and eventually becomes negative for max , suggesting that the countercyclical bond supply from the government is bene…cial to the economy if not too aggressive, provided that private liquidity is extremely low in the steady state.
The intuition behind these results in the lower panel of Figure 9 is straight forward: If the private asset market does not function well, then more public liquidity surely improves …rms' positions for investment …nancing and thus the aggregate welfare. However, excessive provision of public liquidity could paralyze the private asset market, thus leading to welfare losses. Keep in mind that the government does not use the borrowed resources productively. Table 1 but an increasing and hump-shaped function of the steady-state bond-to-GDP ratio under the alternative calibrations.
The same results hold true under other fundamental shocks. For example, the top-middle window shows that a countercyclical policy reduces welfare for any value of 0 under a shock to asset quality ( t ") unless the asset market does not function very well due to severe resaleability constraints and information problems (bottom-middle window). Similarly, under a shock to resaleability (! t #) of private liquidity, provision of public liquidity is a bad idea (top-right window) unless the asset market is extremely poorly functioning to start with (bottom-right window).
Government Purchase of Troubled Assets
This subsection studies the e¤ects of unconventional policies. During the recent …nancial crisis, one of the most notable policy responses was the direct purchase of toxic assets by the U.S. government, as through the Trouble Asset Purchase Program (TARP). Here we use our model to evaluate the dynamic general equilibrium e¤ects of such unconventional policies.
We make the following simplifying assumptions. The government can accumulate private assets on its balance sheet. The government starts with K G 0 0 units of high-quality assets (owned by the government) and can use tax income to purchase private assets from the asset market during a …nancial crisis. Private assets are unproductive in the hands of the government and cannot be rented out to …rms (i.e., they remain idle on the government's balance sheet until sold back to the market).
In responding to a …nancial crisis, the government purchases troubled assets from the market and sells (only) high-quality assets back to the market under the same resaleability constraint !. Private assets held by the government do not su¤er from the t shock except at the time of purchase.
Denoting I G t as the amount of assets newly purchased by the government in period t, the government's budget constraint is then given by
where the left-hand side is income ‡ows, which include revenue from lump-sum taxes T t , income from newly issued bonds P B Consequently, a trade o¤ arises: The unconventional government policy has both a positive e¤ect on the economy -through its cleansing e¤ect on asset quality -and also a negative e¤ect on the economy -as high-quality assets are unproductive in the hands of the government.
The welfare-gain function ( ) under the unconventional government policy is graphed in Figure   10 . Unlike the case of conventional policy, the …gure shows that unconventional policy is quite e¤ective in improving welfare for 2 [0; max ] under the parameter calibrations in Table 1 , suggesting that direct purchase of troubled assets is preferred to issuing more bonds regardless of the aggregate shocks triggering the …nancial crisis (including TFP shocks).
However, an excessive response to the …nancial crisis (with max ) can also be welfare reducing. This is so because private assets are unproductive in the hands of the government, thus accumulating too many private assets on the government balance sheet for too long is not necessarily wise.
Literature Review
The empirical motivation of our paper is based on the in ‡uential works of Krishnamurthy and VissingJorgensen (2012) and Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) . These papers discuss the causes and the consequences of a credit spread. In particular, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) not only empirically investigate the e¤ects of government debt on asset prices, but also decompose the spread into a safety premium and a liquidity premium, which motivates us to construct a theory for such decompositions over business cycles and to connect with the phenomenon of the ‡ight to quality and ‡ight to liquidity. Also see Beber, Brandt and Kavajecz (2008) and Baele, Bekaert, Inghelbrecht and Wei (2013) for the empirical evidence of ‡ight to quality and ‡ight to liquidity. Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) examine the predictive e¤ects of credit spreads on economic activities over the business cycle by constructing a new credit-spread index, called the "GZ credit spread" shown in our Figure 4 .
As emphasized by Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) , the convenience yield of government bonds is due to the fact that government bonds used for public liquidity are not only safe but also liquid. We capture this dual property of government bonds in our theoretical model. We also consider welfare consequences of the provision of public liquidity in this context.
In this regard, our work is mainly motivated by the seminal works of Woodford (1990) and Holmström and Tirole (1998) , who are among the …rst to address the provision of public liquidity. Both papers show that public liquidity generates a crowding-in e¤ect. Our paper shows that public liquidity may generate adverse e¤ects by crowding out private liquidity in the presence of information frictions in the …nancial market. Kiyotaki and Moore (2012) and Del Negro et al. (2016) o¤er a macro framework to characterize liquidity shortages as represented by asset-resaleability constraints, which can address the issue of ‡ight to liquidity. On the other hand, Eisfeldt (2004) , Kurlat (2013) and Bigio (2015) , among others, introduce adverse selection into a macro framework to study the issue of ‡ight to quality. However, this literature studies the adverse-selection problem and the resaleability problem in isolation, both market liquidity and market safety of private assets do not interact with each other nor respond to policies over the business cycle.
We contribute to this literature by developing a tractable dynamic general equilibrium model, which endogenizes both the market liquidity and the market quality of private assets, thus enabling us to structurally and quantitatively account for the joint behaviors of the liquidity premium and safety premium in government bonds and the associated phenomena of the ‡ight to quality and ‡ight to liquidity that have long intrigued and puzzled …nancial economists. Moreover, our work predicts that safe and liquid government bonds can crowd out private liquidity, which is consistent with the recent empirical …ndings by Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2015) and Greenwood, Hanson and Stein (2015) .
Our work is also related to the burgeoning literature on the shortage of safe assets after the outbreak of the global …nancial crisis. This literature includes Benigno and Nisticò (2017 ), Caballero and Farhi (2013 , Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas (2016) , Gorton and Ordonez (2013) , Barro, Fernández-Villaverde, Levintal, and Molleru (2014) , Andolfatto and Williamson (2015) , Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2016 ), and He, Krishnamurthy, and Milbradt (2016a , 2016b . See Gorton (2016) and Golec and Perotti (2017) for surveys of this literature. Cui and Radde (2015) , and Dong, Wang and Wen (2016) adopt a search-theoretic approach to modeling frictions in the resale of assets. This literature endogenizes asset resaleability through search frictions, but does not consider the endogenous interactions of the liquidity premium and safety premium over the business cycle or the e¤ect of public liquidity on private liquidity. A notable exception is Cui (2016) , who uses the framework of Cui and Radde (2015) to analyze the monetary and …scal interactions for asset markets with search and matching frictions. Cui (2016) endogenizes resaleability constraints and then obtains an endogenous liquidity premium. Since there is no information asymmetry in his model, a safety premium is thus absent therein. Complementary to Cui's (2016) work, we show that information frictions can serve as a potential micro foundation for the search and matching frictions in …nancial markets by discouraging asset trading and thus endogenizing the resaleability of assets. In this regard, our paper is the …rst attempt at providing a structural and uni…ed framework to quantitatively address the decomposition and interactions between the liquidity premium and the safety premium.
Our paper is also related to the large literature on adverse selection under private information, in addition to the macro papers by Eisfeldt (2004) , Kurlat (2013) and Bigio (2015) aforementioned. See Williamson and Wright (1994) for an early application of information asymmetry to the …rst-generation models of monetary search. Guerrieri, Shimer and Wright (2010) propose a model of competitive search under adverse selection, and Guerrieri and Shimer (2014) propose a model of dynamic ‡ight to quality with adverse selection. Additionally, the recent progress in the monetary/liquidity search literature on information frictions include Lester, Postlewaite and Wright (2012) , Rocheteau (2011) , and Li, Rocheteau, and Weill (2012) .
Finally, our paper discusses both conventional and unconventional liquidity policies and their welfare consequences. In addition to the aforementioned literature in the Introduction for unconventional government policies, Gertler and Karadi (2013) and Wen (2013 Wen ( , 2014 study the macro e¤ects of largescale asset purchases (LSAPs). In addition, House and Masatlioglu (2015) show that government-asset purchase programs tend to generate favorable impacts on private investment.
Conclusion
In this paper we endogenize the liquidity and the quality of private assets in an incomplete …nancial-market model with heterogeneous agents. The analytical tractability of our model facilitates the decomposition of the convenience yields into a liquidity premium and a safety premium over the business cycle. When calibrated to match the U.S. aggregate output ‡uctuations and asset premiums, the model reveals that a sharp reduction in the quality, instead of the liquidity, of private assets was the culprit of the recent …nancial crisis, consistent with the perception that it was the subprime mortgage problem that triggered the recent …nancial crisis and the Great Recession. Since the provision of public liquidity endogenously a¤ects the provision of private liquidity in our model, we are able to show that excessive injection of public liquidity during a …nancial crisis can be welfare reducing under either conventional or unconventional policies. In particular, too much intervention for too long can paralyze the private asset market.
Our model also features multiple steady states. In this paper, we have focused on the local dynamics around the steady state with positive bond returns. In future research we intend to study the low liquidity state with negative bond yields, which may have interesting implications not only for endogenous persistence and propagation of the …nancial crisis, but also for the negative nominalinterest-rate phenomenon in Europe after the global …nancial crisis (see Dong and Wen, 2017) .
Another interesting extension of our model is to connect it with the New Keynesian framework with nominal rigidity and a zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate. Such an extension can allow us to study the interaction between …scal and monetary policies in the presence of adverse selection in …nancial markets.
Our model can also be extended to study both market liquidity and funding liquidity. In this paper, we focus on the interplay among adverse selection, the resaleability of private assets, and the provision of public liquidity, but we have not considered funding liquidity or other forms of …rm debts (as in Wang and Wen, 2012) . In addition, although our paper admits endogenous asset quality and liquidity in a production economy, an intriguing extension is to endogenize the creation of lemon assets, as in Li, Rocheteau and Weill (2012), Neuhann (2016) and Caramp (2016) .
Appendix
A Data Description
Safety/Liquidity Premium: We follow Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) to construct safety and liquidity premiums in Figure 1 . On the one hand, the safety premium refers to the spread of pairs of assets with similar liquidity but di¤erent safety (higher-and lower-grade corporate bonds and commercial paper). In particular, we use the spread between AAA and BAA bonds to measure the safety premium. Those two kinds of assets share similar turnover rates (liquidity) and the main di¤erence lies in the safety (adverse selection or default risk). On the other hand, the liquidity premium We obtained the quarterly data for the 3-month T-bill rate from FRED.
B Proof of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1 to Proposition 3: First, we guess (and verify later) that the value function of a …rm is linear in fk t ; b t g:
We then have
where
Substituting equation (B.1) into the LHS of equation (10), and substituting equations (2), (11), (B.2) and (B.3) into the RHS of equation (10) yields
where Q B t = P B t , t = P K t =Q t , and capital's e¤ective depreciation rate is t = 1 (1 t ) : Keep in mind that we set = 1 for illustration purpose in the main context. We now derive the general results here under 2 [0; 1].
Denote " t = 1=Q t and " t = 1=q K t . On the one hand, when " t > " t , the constraint (6) implies d t = 0, and equation (11) suggests that
Thus, the RHS of equation (B.4) can be further simpli…ed to
Using constraints (6) and (12), we obtain k l;s t = ! t k t , k b t = 0, and b t+1 = 0. Then k g;s t = ! t (1 ) k t if and only if " t > " t . Due to adverse selection, we have t = P K t =Q t < 1. Thus P K t < Q t , and
Substituting equation (B.5) into equation (B.1) suggests that, for any " t > " t , we have
On the other hand, when " t " t , constraint (6) implies i t = 0. Thus the RHS of equation (B.4) can be rewritten as
where k g;s t = 0 because P K t < Q t , as proved above. Meanwhile, k l;s t = ! t k t :Substituting equation (B.7) into (B.1) suggests that, for any " t " t , we have
To sum up, for 8" t 2 E = (" min ; " max ), …rms' policy functions are given by
otherwise
where the two cut-o¤s f" t ; " t g are characterized by equation (B.6). As a result, we also have
Consequently, equations (B.2) and (B.3) can be rewritten, respectively, as
(B.8)
It is worth noting that 1 unit of bond costs P B t < 1 (real) dollars today and its return tomorrow (at maturity) is 1 (real) dollar plus a premium measured in consumption goods, which is identical to the option value of output. Because bonds are not subject to resaleability constraint and adverse selection, they have the same option value as one unit of real output:
This option value is larger than the option value of the marginal product of capital because of capitalmarket imperfections: resaleability constraints and asymmetric information. Hence, the spread between the rate of return to bonds and the marginal product of capital is the convenience yield (CY )
and it contains a liquidity premium due to the resaleability constraint and a safety premium due to the information friction.
Note that the aggregate supply of good capital and that of lemon capital are given by (1 F (" t )) (1 ) !K t and !K t , respectively. Meanwhile, the aggregate investment is given by
The above equation shows that aggregate investment is …nanced through (1) bond returns plus the internal cash ‡ow R t K t and the resale value of lemon assets ! P K K, adjusted by the number of active …rms (1 F (" )) (for inactive …rms the proceeds of lemon assets go to dividends); and (2) the liquidation value of good assets (1 ) !P K K adjusted by the number of very productive …rms who liquidate good assets (1 F (" )).
Therefore, the law of motion for aggregate capital stock is characterized by
Similarly, we obtain 
where the right-hand side is the payo¤ of newly installed capital in period t + 1 (the expected present value of future cash ‡ows generated from 1 unit of new capital). The term in the …rst pair of square brackets in equation (B.9) is the option value of 1 unit of output. Firms can opt not to undertake investment (or convert output into capital goods) because waiting has the following option value: If the e¢ciency shock is low (or "Q < 1, which happens with Pr (" < " )), 1 unit of real cash (output)
can be kept in hand and its value remains the same (1 real dollar); but if the e¢ciency shock is high, one unit of output can be converted into " units of capital goods, which is worth "Q = " " > 1 real dollars, which happens with probability Pr (" " ). So the option value of a real dollar (shadow value of output) is given by
The term in the second pair of square brackets in the second row of equation (B.9) is the option value of used (high-quality) capital. First, one unit of used capital has a shadow value of Q if kept in hand. Second, it has a market value of P K if sold to the asset market to …nance investment, with a return of P K "Q = " " P k units of real cash. Since a …rm will liquidate good capital if and only if " " , the expected option value of used (high-quality) capital is where we used the relationships Q = 1=" and P K = 1=" in deriving the last equality.
With these de…nitions and understanding of the option values of goods and used capital, the RHS of Equation (B.9) is interpreted as follows. The expected payo¤ from one unit of new capital in period , where the cuto¤ is " applies because good capital is liquidated only if " " . The third row is the value of the remaining (1 !) (1 ) units of unsold (high-quality) capital, whose shadow value is simply Q t+1 . In other words, the shadow value of capital is Q instead of Q
if it is kept in hand.
Denote R K t = r k t+1 +(1 ) k t+1 k t as the rate of return to private assets and R B t = 1=P B t as the rate of return to government bonds. Then the convenience yield is given by
where (by using equation (B.8))
It is easy to show that lim !!1 r ! t = 0 and lim !0 r t = 0. That is, the "liquidity premium" vanishes when ! = 1 and the "quality premium" vanishes when = 0.
Proof of Proposition 5: Given asset price P K , all the other variables in the steady state can be solved recursively according to the following order (all the equations come from the dynamic system in Appendix C): 
"dF R "max " "dF ;
Now it remains to pin down P K . Denote B 0 as the aggregate supply of government bonds.
Then the asset price P K can be solved by the market clearing condition for bonds: B P K = B.
More speci…cally, by
That is, since we have shown that both B=K and K are functions of P K , the aggregate demand for public liquidity is given by B P K = B K K, which is also a function of P K . Thus P K is determined by the market-clearing condition for bonds, B P K = B. Note that the bond yield R B is simply the inverse of P K . Hence, we can also characterize the bond-market clearing condition as B R B = B.
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C Dynamic System and Log-linearization
Dynamic System
Let t = 1 (1 t ) . The dynamic system of the model is given by the following equations: (1 F (" t )) + (1 ) ! t P K t (1 F (" t )) K t ;
Log-linearizationŶ " t = Q t ; " t = P K t ; t = (1 ) (^ t + f (" ) " " t ) ;
C t Ĉ t+1 +R B t R Z "max " " " dF (") E t" t+1 = 0;
where Under the unconventional policy, the law of motion of capital accumulated by all …rms is modi…ed to
Qt ; P K t = t Q t ;and the Euler equation for Q t remains the same as in equation (B.9) (the case without government interventions).
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The e¤ects of changing the debt-to-GDP ratio on welfare are shown in Figure C .2. Corresponding to section 5.1, the parameters used in generating the left and right panels in Figure C .2 come from 
